Worcester News
WPD – Worcester Police Analysis of the DOJ Report
DOJ’s Mistakes and Mischaracterizations
WPD cooperated extensively with DOJ for over two years, providing them with access to (1) the Department’s Records Management System (RMS), (2) the Evidence.com system where body-worn camera footage and other evidence is stored, (3) Bureau of Professional Standards (BOPS) investigative files, (4) use of force data reports, (5) a sampling of 58 sexual assault incident files, (6) training materials and records from MPTC-mandated student officer and in-service trainings, and (7) Department policies and procedures. To date, DOJ has not specifically identified any of the incidents that it reviewed in its investigation.
Use of Force
Over 1,300 records of uses of force exist in the relevant time period, of which approximately 770 records pertained to only displays of a tool or weapon and approximately 530 consisted of actual uses of force.[1] These data points reveal that WPD officers very rarely use actual force: actual uses of force amount to approximately 0.08% of all incidents.
DOJ claims that WPD engages in a pattern or practice of using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, DOJ minimizes or mischaracterizes the practices of the Department, and the individual incidents referenced in its report. For instance:
DOJ failed to provide important contextual details, such as the officers’ knowledge and experience with certain locations or individuals.
DOJ failed to appropriately describe the subjects’ behavior, including their defiance of officer directives, their resistance to arrest, their violent behavior, their agitation, and/or threats to officers immediately preceding the use of force;
DOJ failed to acknowledge the officers’ attempts to de-escalate prior to resorting to force; and
DOJ failed to acknowledge the nature of the offenses committed and the danger posed by subjects to officers and to the public.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a use of force is grounded in the 4th amendment to the US constitution. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene, rather than 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). The incidents referenced in DOJ’s report were analyzed in hindsight and in a vacuum and lack many key details that would best capture the circumstances of the officers’ uses of force. The four examples detailed below illustrate the scope of DOJ’s omissions and misstatements.
Example #1: Train Station Incident
DOJ describes an incident in its report that involved the use of a taser in apprehending a male subject at Worcester’s Union Station (p.8). DOJ claims that the use of the taser was unreasonable because “the man posed no immediate threat and the only crime the man had committed was loitering.” A review of the incident report makes clear that this is an over-simplified and inaccurate mischaracterization of the incident. Union Station is a problematic location with moderate to high crime, including regular arrests for loitering, alcohol and drug violations, assaults, assault and battery, larcenies, and other crimes. Indeed, the City and WPD have designated a portion of the building as a precinct substation to combat crime and ensure public safety. Consistent with WPD’s experience in other incidents at this location, the subject involved in this particular incident was disorderly, defiant, and aggressive, and appeared to be under the influence of alcohol.
DOJ’s report fails to mention the many attempts made by officers to de-escalate the situation by attempting to explain the loitering laws and providing over a dozen warnings and commands to leave prior to arresting the subject, as well as the increasing aggression of the subject. The incident report indicates that the subject shouted at officers and refused to leave. When the officer attempted to arrest the subject, he resisted—ripping the officer’s hand off of his arm, pushing the officer in the chest, and taking a fighting stance. The officer ordered the subject to the ground before retrieving his taser. Pursuant to the Use of Force Policy, tasers are authorized to defend against an assaultive individual and perceived imminent attack. The officer yelled “Taser!” as the subject was facing him and pulled the trigger. At the same time, the subject turned and began to run, causing the probes to impact the back of the subject’s thick jacket. The probe deployment was ineffective, and the subject fled the building. The officer chased the subject into a narrow alleyway blocked by a barbed wire fence. The subject repeatedly kicked and elbowed the officer before the officer was able to pull him from the alleyway and effectuate the arrest. After the arrest, the officer complied with WPD policy (Use of Force, No. 400) and reported all uses of force to his sergeant. This was not a case where WPD “quickly and unreasonably resort[ed] to using tasers”—the officer had probable cause to believe that the subject committed crimes, including disorderly behavior, disturbing the peace, loitering, resisting arrest, and assault and battery on a police officer, and used reasonable and proportional force to apprehend an agitated and assaultive subject.
Example #2: Walmart Shoplifting Incident
DOJ also describes an incident in which an off-duty officer working at a Walmart punched and used OC (pepper) spray against a shoplifter (p.9). According to DOJ, the officer “observ[ed] the shoplifter get into a waiting vehicle” and used force by punching him in the midsection and face and spraying him with OC spray. DOJ claims that these uses of force “were unreasonable in light of the minor nature of the offenses and the officer’s failure to note in his report any other attempts to control or handcuff the man before resorting to punches.” This description fails to mention the key contextual information that establishes the immediate danger posed to the officer and justifies the officer’s actions and use of force.
This specific Walmart location has the highest rate of theft in the region and requires off-duty officers to be present as part of its operation. Officers assigned to this location are familiar with the shoplifting issues at the store and have experience arresting subjects who are often resistant or unwilling to comply with the officers’ directives. In this particular incident, the officer observed the subject taking a flat screen television, sound bar, and tool kit (worth a total of $745) from the store without paying. The officer then observed the subject getting into a waiting car with the license plates removed. When the officer stepped in front of the car, the unidentified driver unexpectedly accelerated the vehicle in the officer’s direction. This initial encounter occurred so quickly that the officer was unable to attempt to de-escalate the scene. The officer narrowly avoided the car and was able to grab onto the subject, who was partially outside of the of vehicle.
The driver fled the scene with the stolen merchandise, and the officer was left with the subject, who began to elbow and kick the officer. Other officers on the scene described that the subject attempted to head butt and kick the officer and flailed his body to resist arrest. The arresting officer verbally told the subject to stop resisting before resorting to strikes. As the officer used his weight to hold the subject to the ground, the subject continued to resist arrest. The officer warned the subject that he would use OC spray if he did not comply. The subject refused to de-escalate, and the officer deployed his OC spray. Ultimately, with the assistance of two additional officers, the officer was able to arrest the subject. The arresting officer immediately reported his uses of force to his sergeant, as required. This was not a situation where, as DOJ alleges, the subject committed a minor offense or where the officer could have further de-escalated the situation prior to resorting to force. The uses of force employed by the officer were appropriate and proportionate given the subject’s volatile and assaultive behavior.
Example #3: Skilled Nursing Facility Incident
DOJ’s report also references an incident involving an agitated patient at a skilled nursing facility who needed to be transported to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation and treatment (p.9). According to DOJ, the man was handcuffed, resisted being escorted to the stretcher by pulling his arms to his chest, thrashing, kicking at officers, and spitting on an officer, leading an officer to punch the subject in the face three times. Yet again, DOJ’s description of this incident is incomplete.
The officer’s incident report reveals that he was both familiar with this skilled nursing facility and with this particular subject, who he had previously needed to involuntarily admit for psychiatric evaluation (known as “Section 12”) at the same skilled nursing facility in the past. The subject has a long history with WPD: data available in RMS suggests that he has been arrested approximately 60 times in the past, including for resisting arrest and for assault and battery on a police officer. As it relates to this particular incident, the supervising nurse had described the subject as combative and threatening to assault staff and other patients, and Worcester EMS requested that police respond and secure the scene before they could safely transport the subject for evaluation.
Responding officers made numerous attempts to de-escalate the subject by communicating why they were there and what was going on, but the subject was unwilling to de-escalate and continued to threaten to attack anyone who touched him. When the officers moved to either side of the subject to escort him to the stretcher, the subject pulled his arms to his chest area, spit on the officers, and thrashed around to break free. Despite DOJ’s description of the incident, the subject was not handcuffed at this time. One of the officers attempted to turn the subject onto his stomach to secure him with handcuffs, but the subject tucked his hands underneath him, further resisting the officer’s attempts. The subject also kicked at the officers, striking them in the legs. One of the officers delivered three closed fist strikes to the side of the subject’s face in response to the subject’s behavior. The officer’s report describes in detail his intent and intensity of his strikes in his report: the officer used his non-dominant hand (while his dominant hand was trying to maintain control over the subject), and the strikes were used to distract the subject to encourage him to cease assaulting officers. The distraction effort was successful, and the officers were finally able to handcuff the subject. The officers then evaluated the subject for injuries. No injuries were visible, and the subject stated that he was uninjured. The officer immediately notified his sergeant of his use of force, as required.
Example #4: Condemned Building Incident
In connection with WPD’s use of K-9s, DOJ describes an incident in which a canine was deployed to search a condemned building and bit a woman hiding under a blanket (p.13). According to DOJ, none of the offenses committed by the woman (breaking and entering, destruction of property, trespassing, and resisting arrests) “involved assaulting or threatening officers or others.” DOJ’s description fails to capture the danger of the situation encountered by officers at this particular scene and officers’ experience with earlier reports of crimes at this specific location.
This incident involved a condemned and unoccupied residence. Officers had responded to 69 separate incidents at this particular property in the previous six months, including 15 calls (4 for trespassing and 2 for breaking and entering) in the month of the incident alone. The management company for the property had boarded up all access points and posted “NO Trespass” signs around the exterior of the property, while Code Enforcement had condemned the building and affixed their own placards around the building. In this incident, officers were called to the scene for a breaking and entering in progress. They were notified by the property owner that at least one individual remained within the building. The owner asked officers to search and clear the property so that he could safely enter the building. The responding officers decided to search the building with the aid of a K-9 for officer safety. This decision was made for three main reasons. First, officers understood from the property owner that a crime had been and was being committed. Second, officers had conducted searches of this particular building prior to this incident and were aware that the building posed an extreme tactical disadvantage to officers. Third, the officers were aware that the building had an attic space and that, just a few weeks prior to this incident, another officer in Massachusetts was shot and killed (and his K-9 was shot) while searching an attic in similar circumstances.
The officers shouted announcements (“Worcester Police K-9. Make yourself known, the dog will find and may bite you”) before entering the building, and the K-9 officer made a total of 11 announcements during the search at five strategic locations throughout the property. The officer waited approximately 5 seconds after each announcement to allow time for any individuals to surrender prior to using force. The subject did not comply with the announcements, and the dog physically apprehended her. The canine was immediately removed once tactically feasible, and the subject was transported to a hospital for treatment. As required, the K-9 supervisor was notified of the use of force and responded to the scene, and photographs were taken.
Vice Squad Operations and Public Complaints
The Department’s Vice Squad investigates drug- and prostitution-related offenses and consists of 15 officers and 4 supervisors. In total, approximately 2,465 drug- and prostitution-related arrests were made from January 2018 to November 2022. Of the prostitution-related offenses, WPD arrested 204 “Johns” and 99 women engaged in prostitution activities. Indeed, Vice Squad conducted only approximately 30 prostitution stings in the relevant five-year period, otherwise devoting its resources to drug enforcement. Moreover, prostitution stings were only conducted in response to neighborhood complaints from members of the community, such as business owners and schools. These figures are consistent with the Department’s shift away from supply-targeted enforcement to demand-targeted enforcement in the last 5+ years.
These figures put the Vice Squad’s operations into context and make clear the infrequency of the Department’s prostitution-related enforcement activities. The Department does not condone sexual misconduct of any kind and takes any allegations of any misconduct very seriously.
In late 2022, the Department was made aware of general allegations of misconduct in local press coverage. In December 2022, WPD received a copy of a term paper prepared by Clark University students that anonymously surveyed women currently or previously engaged in prostitution regarding their experiences with WPD officers or individuals they believed were WPD officers. The paper raised concerning allegations, but relied on anecdotal and anonymized accounts, instructing respondents “not [to] include any identifying information anywhere on the survey . . . includ[ing] your name, address, phone number, or any other personal information.” In fact, the students who worked on the report have since attempted to withhold their paper from public disclosure given its limitations and flaws in methodology. See Brad Petrishen, Feds May Investigate Claims of Worcester Police Misconduct Involving Prostitution, Worcester Telegram & Gazette (Dec. 18, 2022) (“We do not believe our research methods would hold up as credible due to the time frame and sampling of the study.”). Despite its best efforts, WPD has been unable to follow up with any of the respondents about their allegations, and has no information about the identity of the women surveyed, the officers alleged to have engaged in misconduct, the date, time, or location of any alleged misconduct, or any other specific information that would allow it to fully investigate the allegations without the involvement of the anonymous respondents.
Specific complaint information is essential for any kind of comprehensive investigation. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for members of the public to impersonate police officers during interactions with women engaged in the commercial sex trade in order to avoid paying for their services. For example, less than a month ago, officers arrested an individual driving a de-commissioned unmarked police vehicle (or a vehicle modified to resemble unmarked police vehicle). The vehicle had a state police sticker and charity plate, as well as a police-style antenna on the back. The individual was also found to be carrying a wallet that said, “Mass State Police,” as well as a police badge. This particular individual had a prior arrest for sex for a fee and a past reported sexual assault allegation.
The press coverage in late 2022 attributed many of the misconduct allegations to women working with a specific organization, which WPD has worked with closely in the community and supported in the past. Given the seriousness of the allegations, BOPS investigators made several attempts to meet with leadership of the organization to gather additional information so they could further investigate the allegations. The organization’s leadership declined to cooperate or to participate in its investigation. While WPD recognizes that it is often difficult for victims to come forward and share their experiences, it remains committed to treating everyone with respect and to approaching these sensitive matters with empathy and integrity.
Anonymous complaints are taken seriously by WPD. Indeed, the Department offers several pathways for members of the public to make anonymous complaints and respects the confidentiality of complainants. Without specific details, though, the Department is limited in its ability to investigate and corroborate anonymous accounts. Despite interviewing Vice Squad officers about their work and receiving detailed information related to the anonymous complaints and subsequent investigation of the same, DOJ suggests that the Department should have done more to investigate these allegations, without offering any specific guidance or proposals as to what additional investigative steps WPD could or should have taken.
The Department expressed during its meetings with DOJ that, to the extent DOJ was aware of any other complaints, it hoped that DOJ would share any such relevant information with WPD. Despite writing in its report that it “heard multiple credible accounts” of misconduct, DOJ has not provided any information to WPD beyond what is summarized in its report. WPD supports the investigation and prosecution of any officer found to have engaged in sexual misconduct of any kind.
Investigations of Reported Sexual Assaults
The Sexual Assault Unit (SAU) is based out of WPD’s Detective Bureau and consists of detectives highly trained in the investigation of sexual assaults. The SAU investigates all reported sexual assaults in Worcester. During the time period relevant to DOJ’s investigation, there were 1,674 incidents coded as potential sexual assaults (SA). Because many of the SA files exist only in hard copy and cannot be easily reviewed electronically, DOJ requested a sampling of 58 SA files randomly selected based on case number. WPD provided scanned copies of those files to DOJ. Thus, DOJ’s review was limited to only 3.46% of the total SA cases reported during the time period subject to investigation. Such a small sample is insufficient to use as the basis for conclusions about the general practices of the Department, especially in this area where the trajectory of each investigation is so dependent on the facts of the case and the wishes of the victim.
Indeed, DOJ inaccurately describes the practices of the Sexual Assault Unit (SAU) and alleges that the Unit’s approach is not victim-centered or trauma-informed, despite detailed information provided directly to DOJ to the contrary. Specifically, DOJ’s report broadly mischaracterizes the Unit’s practices and procedures as follows:
DOJ ignored detailed information provided by officers during the investigation regarding their victim-centered and trauma-informed approach to sexual assault investigations, especially that detectives are guided by victims throughout the investigative process.
DOJ failed to acknowledge WPD’s support of victims of sexual assault through direct referrals to and partnerships with community and advocacy organizations and resources;
DOJ failed to acknowledge the close and collaborative relationship between SAU officers and the District Attorney’s Office (DA) and failed to recognize that the SAU’s reports are relied upon by the DA’s Office in deciding whether a case can be prosecuted; and
DOJ failed to acknowledge and mischaracterized the SAU’s efforts to corroborate and investigate sexual assault allegations by conducting interviews and follow-up with witnesses and collecting and reviewing additional evidence.
Each of these deficiencies is discussed in greater detail below.[2]
Victim-Centered and Trauma-Informed Policing
Contrary to the information provided by SAU officers interviewed during the investigation, DOJ repeatedly and incorrectly suggests that WPD does not investigate sexual assaults with a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach. Officers told DOJ that, consistent with MPTC training and best practices, the SAU explains to victims from the outset of their investigation that the victim holds the ball and is in charge of the investigation, including whether to follow the case all the way to court or to drop the case early. Officers inform victims about the statute of limitations and provide an overview of the investigation and prosecution process but otherwise will follow the lead of the victims and make every effort not to re-traumatize the victims by pressuring them to be interviewed or conducting multiple interviews. When asked specifically what “trauma-informed” policing means to them, officers expressed that it is understanding where the victims are coming from, where they are in life, the dynamics and relationships they may have with their abusers, and acknowledging that it is difficult and frightening to trust and speak with a stranger about what may be the most traumatic event that has ever happened to them. This general approach to sexual assault investigations is consistent with the Commonwealth’s Adult Sexual Law Enforcement Guidelines and MPTC training.[3]
The SA files referenced in DOJ’s report demonstrate these principles: several of the investigations involved victims who chose not to proceed, either by explicitly informing officers of their decision or by no showing scheduled meetings or not responding to numerous outreach attempts by officers. In these instances, the SAU respected the wishes of the victims by not pressuring them to proceed and by not further investigating their cases without the victims’ permission. However, as investigators indicated to DOJ, should a victim re-engage in the process in the future by reaching back out to WPD, the SAU would reopen the matter and continue its investigation.
Partnerships and Referrals to Support Services
DOJ faults the SAU as being “ill-equipped to connect victims with community victim advocacy services.” This is false. As addressed during DOJ’s interview of SAU investigators, the Unit partners and connects victims with a wide variety of advocacy and support groups. In cases involving children, WPD partners with the accredited Child Advocacy Center through the DA’s Office. The Center’s partnership involves several non-governmental organizations that work with child victims, including the Seven Hills Foundation. WPD works extensively with the Worcester Intervention Network through the YWCA to support victims of intimate partner abuse and sexual assault and sits on the boards of the Domestic Violence High Risk Teams (DVHRT) and Domestic Violence Fatality Review Teams (DVFRT) to be able to identify, address, and rectify potential gaps in the system. WPD routinely refers adult victims of non-intimate partner sexual assaults to Pathways for Change, a community advocacy center located in Worcester. Elder victims are referred directly to Elder Services, a state advocacy service with connections to other community services. WPD supplements these referrals as appropriate, including for victims with physical and developmental disabilities.
These referrals and partnerships are thoughtful and victim-centered; indeed, to the extent WPD is a step removed once the referral is made, that distance is created to protect victim confidentiality and to protect disclosures made to clinicians and psychologists from discovery. Many of these organizations and partnerships were referenced by officers in their interviews with DOJ investigators. Some of these resources are even mentioned in the very SA case files that DOJ referenced in its report.
Documentation and Coordination with DA’s Office
WPD, and the SAU in particular, has a very close relationship with the Worcester County DA’s Office, frequently collaborating on cases and working together to connect victims with support services and other resources. Ultimately, the DA’s Office, equipped with the SAU’s reports and evidence, decides whether or not to prosecute each case. As such, and as recognized by the Commonwealth’s Guidelines, officers have an obligation to make note of important details, including, but limited to, any physical or verbal resistance on the part of the victim, any victim injury, the victim’s thoughts before and during the assault, the relationship between the victim and offender, any alcohol or drug use or other incapacitation of the victim, the existence of any physical evidence, any seemingly inconsistent statements made by the victim, any memory blackouts or lapses during or after the assault, and any delays in reporting.[4]
DOJ describes SAU’s reports as “seriously flawed” for including these kinds of details, alleging that the detectives “relied on problematic stereotypes” and “uninformed assumptions” (p.25). But including these details—facts that are essential in evaluating whether there is sufficient evidence and probable cause to satisfy the elements of the crime under Massachusetts law—is necessary and important to the SAU’s work. These reports are not opinion pieces, nor are victims met with skepticism or disbelief; these reports are used to determine what charges, if any, are available for prosecution and must accurately include all potentially relevant facts.
Assessment of All Available Evidence
Contrary to DOJ’s assertions, WPD collects, reviews, and analyzes all available evidence in its sexual assault investigations. In the incidents cited in the report alone, detectives interviewed (or sought to interview) victims, requested and reviewed phone records and cell tower “ping” locations, interviewed the victims’ friends and loved ones, and reviewed video footage from surveillance cameras.
The SAU’s approach to this additional evidence is consistent with its victim-centered model: officers will not put victims in danger or involve others in the investigation without permission from the victim. If officers are unable to reach a victim after making reasonable efforts to do so, they will not proceed with speaking to other witnesses or collecting additional evidence so as not to endanger or retraumatize the victim or to break the trust between the officers and the victim.
Enforcement Activities, Data Collection, and Data Analysis
DOJ’s report, like the CNA Racial Equity Audit before it, criticizes WPD for its data collection and analysis practices. The Department is fully supportive of additional data collection and sharing of data with the public, but has, to date, been limited by the capabilities of its record management system (RMS). As described more fully in Part III below, the City and Department are in the process of developing and implementing a new RMS system that will allow for more extensive data collection and analysis. WPD informed DOJ of this replacement project several times, including during their first meeting in December 2022. In January 2024, in an effort to align with DOJ on these data-related issues as it worked to configure the new RMS platform, WPD reached out proactively to DOJ and sought their guidance as to best practices related to RMS data capture, reporting, review, and analysis. DOJ recommended three consultants that WPD could consider reaching out to for advice, but did not otherwise offer any specific guidance.
DOJ’s conclusion that WPD’s enforcement activities disproportionately affect Hispanic and Black people is based primarily on a review of traffic stop, citation, and arrest data. While this trend was also observed in the CNA Audit, DOJ’s data analysis is seriously flawed in that it relies on “the overall demographics of drivers stopped by WPD” (p.27) (emphasis added). But this conclusion entirely unsupported because WPD does not collect race data on drivers stopped by the Department—something that it has been criticized for by both CNA and DOJ. WPD does, however, collect race data for citations. In comparing citation data to Worcester census data from 2018 to 2023,[5] the disparities observed by DOJ are much less significant:
Race
% of Citations
% of Population
Difference
White (Not Hispanic)
% of Citations: 52.1%
% of Population: 50.5%
Difference: +1.6%
Black
% of Citations: 15.6%
% of Population: 12.1%
Difference: +3.5%
Asian
% of Citations: 2.8%
% of Population: 6.9%
Difference: -4.1%
Hispanic
% of Citations: 27.5%
% of Population: 24.9%
Difference: +2.6%
DOJ also relied on data related to arrests for minor offenses in its conclusion that racial disparities exist in WPD’s enforcement activities. While the new RMS system will help the Department conduct the kinds of analyses that DOJ sought to review in their investigation, it is worth noting that, as CNA found, the data shows that racial disparities actually decrease where officers have greater discretion in issuing citations. This suggests that these disparities cannot simply be explained by officers’ discretion alone, and that there are other factors that need to be better understood and accounted for in the analysis.
[1] The Commonwealth’s definition of “use of force” does not include displays, but WPD has adopted tighter reporting requirements and documents every display of any tool or weapon (including tasers, batons, OC spray, K-9, and firearms).
[2] Out of respect for the privacy of the victims whose cases are highlighted in DOJ’s report, this report will not detail DOJ’s shortcomings on an incident-by-incident basis.
[3] See Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Adult Sexual Assault Law Enforcement Guidelines (2017), https://www.mass.gov/doc/2017-adult-sexual-assault-law-enforcement-guidelines-0/download. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women (OVW), Framework for Prosecutors to Strengthen Our National Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Involving Adult Victims, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/framework-prosecutors-strengthen-our-national-response-sexual-assault-and-domestic-violence.
[4] See Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Adult Sexual Assault Law Enforcement Guidelines (2017), at p.16-18, https://www.mass.gov/doc/2017-adult-sexual-assault-law-enforcement-guidelines-0/download.
[5] See https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/worcestercitymassachusetts/PST045223.
https://www.worcesterma.gov/police/press-releases/worcester-police-analysis-doj-report?utm_source=The016&utm_medium=social
